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The Player’s Effect
Ronen Gradwohl ∗ Omer Reingold † Ariel Yadin ‡ Amir Yehudayoff §
Abstract
In a function that takes its inputs from various players, the effect of a player measures the
variation he can cause in the expectation of that function. In this paper we prove a tight upper
bound on the number of players with large effect, a bound that holds even when the players’
inputs are only known to be pairwise independent. We also study the effect of a set of players,
and show that there always exists a “small” set that, when eliminated, leaves every set with
little effect. Finally, we ask whether there always exists a player with positive effect. We answer
this question differently in various scenarios, depending on the properties of the function and the
distribution of players’ inputs. More specifically, we show that if the function is non-monotone
or the distribution is only known to be pairwise independent, then it is possible that all players
have 0 effect. If the distribution is pairwise independent with minimal support, on the other
hand, then there must exist a player with “large” effect.
1 Introduction
A general recurring theme in the analysis of games is the juxtaposition of two distinct sources of
players’ motivation to act strategically: The first is the myopic maximization of their own immediate
gain, and the second is a consideration of the effect their behavior has on other players and possibly a
collective outcome. This theme surfaces in many settings. For example, in a repeated game in which
players both maximize their utilities and learn others’ preferences, players must strike a balance
between playing to obtain immediate gain and playing to learn (or teach). Another example is the
setting of an extensive game with many players, in which the actions of a player yield him some
utility but also affect the choices of the subsequent players.
In such settings, players who have little impact on others or on a collective outcome more
or less ignore the second source of motivation for their strategic behavior, and can be shown to
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act myopically. This has been demonstrated more precisely for many examples: The provision of
a public good [11, 1], repeated games [12, 2], and mechanisms for choosing equilibria in private
information economies [3].
There are many ways one can quantify the impact of a player on others or on a collective
outcome. Two notable notions that have been widely studied in the economics and computer science
literatures respectively are the effect and the influence of players. We illuminate the distinction
between the two notions via the example of voting.
Suppose there are n players, and let a function f be a voting scheme between two candidates.
Each player has a signal Xi, a binary random variable, and given n binary inputs the voting scheme
f outputs the name of one of the candidates. The effect of a player is the amount of variation he
can cause in the expectation (over players’ signals) of f by a unilateral change in his own signal.
Note that this is an a priori notion – a player’s effect is measured without assuming any knowledge
of the other players’ votes, only their distribution. The influence of a player, on the other hand, is
defined as the probability (over all the players’ votes) that a specific player casts the deciding vote.
This is an a posterior notion, since a player has impact on the outcome after others have already
received their signals and is conditional on their respective votes.
Previous Work The notion of influence was introduced by Ben-Or and Linial [5]. The seminal
paper in this line of work is that of Kahn, Kalai and Linial [9] (henceforth KKL), in which they
showed that in any voting scheme, if the players’ signals are independent then there always exists a
player with “large” influence. Following this paper, there has been much work studying the notion
of influence (see Kalai and Safra [10] for a survey).
The notion of effect was studied by Malaith and Postlewaite [11] and by Fudenberg, Levine, and
Pesendorfer [6]. The results most similar to ours are those of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky [1], who
gave tight bounds on the number of players with large effect. One of their assumptions is that the
players’ signals are independent (or at least independent conditional on some outside information).
Their methods do not apply to general distributions.
Haggstrom, Kalai and Mossel [8] studied the notion of effect in general distributions, and showed
that there is complete aggregation of information (this means that a small tendency towards one
outcome for each player gives a strong tendency in the general outcome) under certain conditions
related to the distribution and the effects.
Our Results We answer questions similar to those of [1] and [9] in the context of distributions
that are only weakly independent. As in [1], we give a tight bound on the number of players with
large effect. The novelty of our bound is that we assume only minimal independence of players’
signals. More precisely, our bound holds even when the players are only pairwise independent. Note
that when the players are 1-wise independent, all players may have maximal effect. Additionally,
we study the effects of coalitions of players. We show that a small set of players can be eliminated,
leaving only coalitions with small effect.
We also ask whether a KKL-type theorem holds for effect – that is, does there always exist
some player with large effect? We have three results here: First, we observe that if the function is
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not monotone, then it is possible that all effects are 0, even in the fully independent case. Second,
we show that there exists a pairwise independent distribution and a monotone function such that
all players’ effects are again 0. Also, we use similar ideas to show that there exists a pairwise
independent distribution and a monotone function such that all players have influence 0; i.e. a
KKL-type theorem does not hold for influence either, in the case of pairwise independence. Finally,
we give a positive result: we show that if the distribution is pairwise independent and of minimal
size, then there exists a player with very large effect.
Organization The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with some formal
definitions, and then proceeds with formal statements of all our results. Section 3 contains the
proofs of our theorems bounding the number of players and sets with large effect, and Section 4
contains the proofs of our results on KKL-type theorems.
2 Definitions and Main Results
2.1 Definitions
Let n ∈ N, and let S be a finite set (whose size may depend on n). Let f : Sn 7→ [−1, 1] be some
function, let X1, . . . ,Xn be n random variables (which are not necessarily independent) taking
values in S, and denote by X = (X1, . . . ,Xn). We think of each Xi as a player. If S = {0, 1}, then
we have the notion of the effect of a player.
Definition 2.1 (Effect) For i ∈ [n], denote
Ei(f,X) =
∣∣E
X
[f |Xi = 1]− E
X
[f |Xi = 0]
∣∣
the effect of player Xi in f with respect to X. For α ∈ R, we say that Xi has effect α in f with
respect to X if
Ei(f,X) > α.
Denote by K(f,X, α) the number of players with effect α in f with respect to X.
For arbitrary discrete sets S, we have the following generalization of the effect of a player.
Definition 2.2 (pivotal player) For p, α ∈ R, we say that Xi is (p, α)-pivotal in f with respect
to X if
Pr
Xi
[∣∣E
X
[f |Xi]− E
X
[f ]
∣∣ > α] > p.
Denote by K(f,X, p, α) the number of (p, α)-pivotal players in f with respect to X.
Additionally, for a random variable X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) and a set T ⊆ [n], let XT = (Xi)i∈T be
the projection of X onto the variables in T .
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Definition 2.3 (Pivotal set of players) For p, α ∈ R, we say that T ⊆ [n] is (p, α)-pivotal in f
with respect to the random variable X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) if
Pr
[∣∣∣E[f |XT ]− E[f ]∣∣∣ > α] > p.
The notions of effect, pivotal players, and pivotal sets of players are relevant even for variables
that are not fully independent. We relax the assumption of full independence as follows.
Definition 2.4 (k-wise independence) The random variables X1, . . . ,Xn are k-wise indepen-
dent if for any subset T ⊂ [n], |T | ≤ k, the random variables {Xi : i ∈ T} are independent.
We also state here the precise definition of influence.
Definition 2.5 (Influence) Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function, and let µ be a distribution on
{0, 1}n. The influence of the i’th player is
Ii(f, µ) = Pr
x∼µ
[f(x) 6= f(x⊕ ei)] ,
where ei is the vector with 1 at the i’th index and 0 elsewhere, and ⊕ is bitwise XOR.
2.2 Main Results
The following theorem bounds the number of pivotal players.
Theorem 2.6 Let n ∈ N, and let S be a finite set. Let f : Sn 7→ [−1, 1] be some function.
Let X1, . . . ,Xn be n pairwise independent random variables taking values in S, and denote X =
(X1, . . . ,Xn). Then for every positive α, p ∈ R,
K(f,X, p, α) <
8
pα2
.
We note that the above theorem was known for the case of fully independent random variables
(see [1]). However, we consider the much more general case of pairwise independence. We note also
that for the case where all the players vote the same (i.e. the signals are 1-wise independent), and
f is boolean such that f(0, . . . , 0) = 0 and f(1, . . . , 1) = 1,
K(f,X, 1, 1) = n,
so the conclusion of the theorem does not hold.
We now turn our attention to the effect of a set of players – that is, how much can a set of
players cause variation from the expectation of a function. A first observation is that if some player
i is (p, α)-pivotal, then any set of players that contains i is at least as pivotal.
However, we still prove a rather strong statement. The theorem is a generalization of a theorem
of Gradwohl and Reingold [7] to the case of variables that are not fully independent. Roughly, the
theorem states that it is possible to eliminate some not too large set of players T , so that any set
of some bounded size that does not intersect T will have little influence.
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Theorem 2.7 Fix some natural number m. Then for any set of 2m-wise independent random
variables X1, . . . ,Xn, any 0 < α < 1, 0 < p < 1, and any function f , the following holds: there
exists a set C ⊆ [n] of size |C| ≤ 8m/pα2, such that for all T ⊆ [n] \ C of size |T | ≤ m, the set T
is not (p, α)-pivotal.
2.3 Example
The following example, a function we call Majp, is from [1], and shows that our bound on the
number of pivotal players in Theorem 2.6 is tight. Let n ∈ N, let 0 < p < 1, and let S = {0, 1,⊥}.
For each player i ∈ [n], suppose Pr [Xi = 0] = Pr [Xi = 1] = p/2, and Pr [Xi =⊥] = 1 − p. Let
f : Sn 7→ {0, 1} be the majority function over all players that did not output ⊥.
We say that a player participates if he does not output ⊥. Then every player participates with
probability p, and is influential if the remaining players who did not output ⊥ are split evenly
between 0’s and 1’s. If the number of participating players is pn (which is roughly the case with
overwhelming probability), then the player is influential with probability roughly 1/
√
pn. Thus,
every one of the n players is roughly (p, 1/
√
pn)-pivotal. Setting α ≈ 1/√pn, we get that n ≈ 1
pα2
,
which is the number of (p, α)-pivotal players. Note that we can vary the value of α in this example
by picking some natural number k ≤ n such that α ≈ 1/√pk. The function we consider is then the
function above, but only over some arbitrary set of k players. In this case, those k players will all
be (p, α)-pivotal.
2.4 General KKL-Type Results
The questions raised in this section are motivated by the celebrated result of Kahn, Kalai, and
Linial [9]. Roughly, their result states that for every balanced Boolean function on {0, 1}n and fully
independent inputs there exists a player with influence at least Ω(log(n)/n).
The notions of influence and effect are closely related in several specific cases. Here we ask
whether a KKL-type theorem holds with regard to effect. More specifically, we ask the following
question:
Does there always exist a player with large effect?
We show that the answer to this question depends strongly on the underlying distribution of the
players and the properties of the function. We also extend one of our negative results to the original
notion of influence, and show that a KKL-type theorem does not hold for general distributions,
even for monotone functions (see Section 4.2).
2.4.1 Full Independence
We first consider the question stated above for the case in which the players’ signals are fully
independent. The first observation is that for monotone functions, the notions of influence and
effect are equivalent [8]. This means that for fully independent players and balanced monotone
functions, the original KKL theorem roughly states that there exists a player with effect at least
log(n)/n.
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How about non-monotone functions? It is possible to transform a non-monotone function into
a monotone one in such a way that the influences do not increase [9]. Hence, a lower bound on the
influence of a player for all monotone functions gives a similar bound for all functions. However,
such a transformation does not exist for effects. Consider, for example, the PARITY function,
in which each player independently outputs a bit generated by a fair coin toss. Then here all
influences are 1, but all effects are 0. In particular, a KKL-type theorem for effect does not hold
for non-monotone functions – there is no non-trivial lower bound on the effect of a player in a
non-monotone function, even in the case of full independence. Hence, in the following sections, we
only consider monotone functions.
2.4.2 Pairwise Independence – Negative Results
In the previous section we noted that for monotone functions with full independence, the original
KKL theorem states that there exists a player with large effect. We also saw that without mono-
tonicity, this does not hold. In this section we ask whether full independence is necessary (when the
function is monotone), or whether some weaker guarantee such as pairwise independence suffices.
In Section 4.1 we show that there exists a balanced monotone function f and a pairwise inde-
pendent distribution D over {0, 1}n such that
Ei(f,D) = 0
for all i ∈ [n]. This implies that there is no non-trivial lower bound on the effect of a player for
pairwise independent distributions, even for monotone functions.
Furthermore, in Section 4.2 we extend these results to show that there exists a balanced mono-
tone function g and a pairwise independent distribution D′ such that
Ii(g,D
′) = 0
for all i ∈ [n].
2.4.3 Pairwise Independence – Positive Result
In the previous section, we showed that, for the case of pairwise independence, monotonicity does
not suffice in order for some KKL-type theorem to hold. In this section, we show that a KKL-type
theorem does hold in a restricted special case. Roughly, we show that for all pairwise independent
distributions with minimal support size, there is a player with effect at least 1/
√
n (for any balanced
function).
Theorem 2.8 Let n + 1 = 2k. Let µ be a pairwise independent distribution on (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈
{0, 1}n, with marginals 1/2 and |supp(µ)| = n+ 1. Let f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}. Then∑
i∈[n]
(Ei(f))2 = Var[f ]
4
.
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A function f is called balanced if its expectation is, say, 1/2, which also implies that its variance
is 1/4. For such functions, the above theorem states that the sum of squares of effects is at least
1/16, and so there exists a player with effect at least 1/(4
√
n).
We now discuss the premise of the above theorem, namely pairwise independent distributions
on {0, 1}n with support size n + 1. First, we note that there are such distributions – µ and µ,
constructed in Section 4.1 are examples. Second, any pairwise independent distribution on {0, 1}n
has support of size at least n + 1. Finally, such a distribution with support of size exactly n + 1
must be uniform on its support – see Benjamini, Gurel-Gurevich, and Peled [4].
We also note that the distribution D from the previous section that served as our counter-
example to any KKL-type theorem for effect has support of size 2(n+1). It seems a small difference
in support size can make a significant difference: For any pairwise independent distribution with
support size n + 1 and balanced function, there exists a player with effect roughly 1/
√
n. On the
other hand, a convex sum of two such distributions yields a distribution for which there exists a
balanced function in which all the effects are 0.
2.5 Preliminaries
We need some preliminary definitions. Let X be a random variable taking values in {0, 1}k. For
two functions g, h : {0, 1}k 7→ [−1, 1], define the inner product (with respect to X)
〈g, h〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
Pr [X = x] · g(x) · h(x)
(for simplicity of notation, we omit the dependency on X from the notation, and will make sure it
is clear from the context). Define the norm of g to be
‖g‖ =
√
〈g, g〉.
3 The Number of Pivotal Players and Sets
We begin with a weaker result then our main theorem because its proof is instructive in that it
contains many of the ideas of the main theorem. The more general case will be proven in Section 3.2.
3.1 Warm-Up: Binary Independent Inputs
The theorem we prove here is the following:
Proposition 3.1 Let n ∈ N, and let f : {0, 1}n 7→ [−1, 1]. If X1, . . . ,Xn are n fully independent
random variables such that Pr[Xi = 1] = Pr[Xi = 0] = 1/2 for all i ∈ [n], then for every positive
α ∈ R,
K(f,X, α) <
4
α2
,
where X = (X1, . . . ,Xn).
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Proof: Let k = K(f,X, α), and without loss of generality assume that the first k variables are
the ones with effect α. Define the function f ′ : {0, 1}k 7→ [−1, 1] as
f ′(x1, . . . , xk) = E
X
[f |X1 = x1, . . . ,Xk = xk].
Also denote X ′ = (X1, . . . ,Xk). For every b ∈ {0, 1} and for every i ∈ [k],
E
X′
[f ′|Xi = b] = E
X′
[E
X
[f |X1 = x1, . . . ,Xk = xk]|Xi = b] = E
X
[f |Xi = b],
and thus player i has effect α in f ′ if and only if player i has effect α in f . Furthermore, assume
without loss of generality that for all i ∈ [k], we have EX [f |Xi = 0] > EX [f |Xi = 1], and so
E
X
[f |Xi = 0]− E
X
[f |Xi = 1] > α
(otherwise consider the function g(x1, . . . , xn) = f(x1, . . . , xi−1, 1 − xi, . . . , xn), and note that this
does not alter the effects of the players).
For i ∈ [k], define the functions bi : {0, 1}k 7→ [−1, 1] as
∀ x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ {0, 1}k bi(x) = (−1)xi .
The functions bi are useful because〈
bi, f
′
〉
= 2−k
∑
x:xi=0
f ′(x)− 2−k
∑
x:xi=1
f ′(x) =
1
2
E
X
[f ′|Xi = 0]− 1
2
E
X
[f ′|Xi = 1] > α
2
by assumption on the effects of X1, . . . ,Xk. Also for i, j ∈ [k], since X1, . . . ,Xn are independent,
〈bi, bj〉 = Pr
X′
[Xi = Xj ]− Pr
X′
[Xi 6= Xj ] =
{
1 i = j
0 i 6= j,
and so
‖b1 + . . .+ bk‖ =
√
k.
Now, on one hand, 〈
b1 + . . .+ bk, f
′
〉
>
kα
2
.
On the other hand, 〈
b1 + . . .+ bk, f
′
〉 ≤ ‖b1 + . . .+ bk‖ · ∥∥f ′∥∥ ≤ √k,
by Cauchy-Schwartz and since ‖f ′‖ ≤ 1. Combining the two inequalities yields
k <
4
α2
.
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3.2 More General {0, 1}n Case
To prove Theorem 2.6, we first assume that the variables Xi are binary, albeit with skewed proba-
bilities. Later we reduce the general case to such variables.
We first prove a bound on the sum of effects of a subset of players (in fact, a more general
lemma is true, but we will not use it).
Lemma 3.2 Let n ∈ N and f : {0, 1}n 7→ [−1, 1], and consider pairwise independent binary random
variables X1, . . . ,Xn, with Pr [Xi = 0] = q, for all i ∈ [n]. Then for all k ∈ [n],
∑
i∈[k]
Ei(f,X) ≤
√
2k
p
,
where p = min{q, 1 − q}.
Proof: Let z ∈ {0, 1} be such that Pr [Xi = z] = p. For each i ∈ [k], fix ai ∈ {−1, 1} such that
ai ·
(
E
X
[f |Xi = z]− E
X
[f |Xi = 1− z]
)
≥ 0.
Also define the functions bi : {0, 1}k 7→ [−1, 1] as
bi(x) =
{
ai xi = z
−ai · p1−p xi = 1− z
for all x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n. Again consider the quantity
〈bi, f〉 = ai
∑
x:xi=z
Pr[X = x]f(x)− ai p
1− p
∑
x:xi=1−z
Pr[X = x]f(x)
= ai Pr [Xi = z] · E[f |Xi = z]− ai p
1− p · Pr [Xi = 1− z] · E[f |Xi = 1− z]
= aip (E[f |Xi = z]− E[f |Xi = 1− z])
= p · Ei(f,X).
By Cauchy-Schwartz and since ‖f‖ ≤ 1,
p ·
∑
i∈[k]
Ei(f,X) = 〈b1 + . . .+ bk, f〉 ≤ ‖b1 + . . .+ bk‖ · ‖f‖ ≤ ‖b1 + . . .+ bk‖ .
We will now bound ‖b1 + . . .+ bk‖.
First we bound 〈bi, bi〉.
〈bi, bi〉 = Pr [Xi = z] + p
2
(1− p)2 Pr [Xi = 1− z]
= p+
p2
1− p.
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Now we bound 〈bi, bj〉 for i 6= j using the pairwise independence of Xi and Xj .
〈bi, bj〉 = aiaj Pr [Xi = Xj = z] + aiaj p
2
(1− p)2 Pr [Xi = Xj = 1− z]− aiaj
p
1− p Pr [Xi 6= Xj ]
= aiaj
(
p2 + p2 − 2p2)
= 0.
Thus,
‖b1 + . . .+ bk‖2 ≤ 2pk,
since p ≤ 1/2. The lemma follows.
We use the previous lemma to get the following bound on the number of players with large
effect.
Lemma 3.3 Let n ∈ N and f : {0, 1}n 7→ [−1, 1], and consider pairwise independent binary random
variables X1, . . . ,Xn, with Pr [Xi = 0] = q, for all i ∈ [n]. Then for every positive α ∈ R,
K(f,X, α) <
2
pα2
,
where p = min{q, 1 − q}.
Proof: As before, let k = K(f,X, α), and without loss of generality assume that the first k
variables are the ones with effect α. Using Lemma 3.2,
α · k <
∑
i∈[k]
Ei(f,X) ≤
√
2k
p
,
which implies
k <
2
pα2
.
3.3 Reducing the General Case to the Boolean Case
We now wish to reduce the general case to the case in which the random variables are binary and
have skewed marginals.
Lemma 3.4 Let n ∈ N, and let S be a finite set. Let f : Sn 7→ [−1, 1] be some function. Let
X1, . . . ,Xn be n pairwise independent random variables taking values in S, and denote X =
(X1, . . . ,Xn). Let α > 0 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Then there exist an integer k ∈ N, a function
g : {0, 1}k 7→ [−1, 1] and pairwise independent binary random variables Y1, . . . , Yk such that
• For every i ∈ [k], Pr [Yi = 0] = p2 , and
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• K(f,X, p, α) ≤ 2 ·K(g, Y, α) = 2k,
where Y = (Y1, . . . , Yk).
Proof: Let I ⊆ [n] be the set of (p, α)-pivotal players in f , and suppose that for at least |I|/2 of
i ∈ I,
Pr [E[f |Xi]− E[f ] > α] > p
2
. (1)
If this does not hold, then simply consider the function f ′ = 1− f , for which (1) will hold. Denote
by I+ the set of indices for which (1) holds. Without loss of generality, assume I+ = {1, . . . , k},
and note that k ≥ K(f,X, p, α)/2.
For every i ∈ I+, denote
pi = Pr [E[f |Xi]− E[f ] > α] > p
2
.
Define Yi = Yi(xi) as follows:
• If E[f |Xi = xi] − E[f ] > α, then with probability p2pi set Yi = 0 (independently of all other
random variables).
• Otherwise, set Yi = 1.
Thus, for every i ∈ I+, we have Pr [Yi = 0] = p2 . Furthermore, since X1, . . . ,Xn are pairwise
independent, Y1, . . . , Yk are pairwise independent. All that remains is to define a function g in
which all of the Yi’s will have large effect.
To this end, define the function g : {0, 1}k 7→ [−1, 1] as
g(y) = E
[
f
∣∣Y1 = y1, . . . , Yk = yk]
for all y = (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ {0, 1}k.
Now, for every i ∈ [k] and z ∈ {0, 1},
E[f |Yi = z] =
∑
y
E [f |Y = y] · Pr [Y = y|Yi = z]
=
∑
y
g(y) · Pr [Y = y|Yi = z]
= E[g|Yi = z]. (2)
An additional claim we need is that E[f |Yi = 0] > E[f ] + α. Denote by
T = {t ∈ supp(Xi) : E[f |Xi = t] > E[f ] + α} .
For any t ∈ T ,
E[f |Yi = 0,Xi = t] =
∑
x:xi=t
f(x) · p
2pi
· Pr[X = x]
Pr[Xi = t, Yi = 0]
= E[f |Xi = t] · p
2pi
· 1
Pr[Yi = 0|Xi = t]
= E[f |Xi = t].
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Hence,
E[f |Yi = 0] =
∑
t∈T
E[f |Xi = t] Pr[Xi = t|Yi = 0] > E[f ] + α.
Therefore, since
E[f ] = E[f |Yi = 0]Pr[Yi = 0] + E[f |Yi = 1]Pr[Yi = 1],
it follows that
E[f |Yi = 1] < E[f ],
which implies
E[f |Yi = 0]− E[f |Yi = 1] > α.
Thus, using (2), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
E[g|Yi = 0]− E[g|Yi = 1] = E[f |Yi = 0]− E[f |Yi = 1] > α.
3.4 Proof of Main Result
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.6.
Proof: By Lemma 3.4, there exists a function g and distribution Y such that K(f,X, p, α) ≤
2 · K(g, Y, α). Since the distribution Y is such that Pr [Yi = 0] = p/2, and the Yi’s are pairwise
independent, Lemma 3.3 implies that K(g, Y, α) < 2/(p/2)α2 = 4/pα2. Hence,
K(f,X, p, α) <
8
pα2
.
3.5 The Effect of Sets of Players
In this section we generalize Theorem 2.6 and prove Theorem 2.7. We first restate the theorem.
Theorem 3.5 (Theorem 2.7 Restated) Fix some natural number m. Then for any set of 2m-
wise independent random variables X1, . . . ,Xn, any 0 < α < 1, 0 < p < 1, and any function f , the
following holds: there exists a set C ⊆ [n] of size |C| ≤ 8m/pα2, such that for all T ⊆ [n] \ C of
size |T | ≤ m, the set T is not (p, α)-pivotal.
Proof: We first bound the possible number of disjoint pivotal sets. Let {Ci}ti=1 be some maximal
collection of sets (i.e. t is maximal) satisfying the following:
• Ci ⊆ [n], |Ci| ≤ m, for all i ∈ [t].
• For all i 6= j, Ci ∩ Cj = ∅.
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• For all i, Ci is (p, α)-pivotal.
Since {Ci}ti=1 is a maximal collection of such sets, any other (p, α)-pivotal set of size at most m
intersects at least one of the Ci’s. We now provide an upper bound on the number t of such sets.
To simplify the exposition, suppose all Ci’s are of sizem, C1 = {1, . . . ,m}, C2 = {m+ 1, . . . , 2m},
and so on. Now consider the function
f ′(X ′1, . . . ,X
′
t,Xmt+1, . . . ,Xn) = f(X1, . . . ,Xn),
where X ′i = XCi . We call all players in f
′ “meta-players”. This function takes the same values as
f , except that it considers the inputs of all the players in Ci as the input of one meta-player. Note
that f ′ has the same expectation as f .
The variables X1, . . . ,Xn are 2m-wise independent, and so X
′
1, . . . ,X
′
t,Xmt+1, . . . ,Xn are pair-
wise independent. This holds because any meta-player depends on at most m original players,
so any 2 meta-players consist of at most 2m players that are all independent. Hence, every 2
meta-players are also independent.
By Theorem 2.6, the number of (p, α)-pivotal players in f ′ is less than 8/pα2. Note that if the
set of players Ci is (p, α)-pivotal in f , then the meta-player X
′
i is (p, α)-pivotal in f
′. Thus, we can
conclude that t < 8/pα2.
Let C =
⋃
i∈[t]Ci. Now consider some set T ⊆ [n] of size |T | ≤ m. If T is disjoint from C, then
T can not be (p, α)-pivotal, since the Ci’s are a maximal collection of disjoint pivotal sets.
We are now done: |C| < 8m/pα2 as required, and for any T ⊆ [n] \C of size |T | ≤ m, T is not
(p, α)-pivotal.
4 General KKL-Type Results
4.1 Pairwise Independence – Negative Result
We will now present a balanced monotone function and a pairwise independent distribution such
that the effects of all players are 0. This will imply that there is no non-trivial lower bound on the
effect of a player for pairwise independent distributions, even for monotone functions.
The rough idea of the construction is that since the support of a pairwise independent distri-
bution can be small, monotonicity does not play much of a role (in the next section, however, we
show that if the support of the distribution is very small, some player must have large effect). We
begin by describing the distribution D used in the counter-example. D will be the convex sum of
two other pairwise independent distributions µ and µ.
Assume n+ 1 = 2k, and identify the set {0, . . . , n} with {0, 1}k (by the binary representation).
µ will be the uniform distribution over a set of n + 1 strings in {0, 1}n. These n + 1 elements in
the support of µ will be denoted by xz, where z = (z1, . . . , zk) runs over all vectors in {0, 1}k . Let
y = (y1, . . . , yk) be a nonzero element of {0, 1}k , or, equivalently, an element of {1, . . . , n}. Then
the y’th index of xz is
xzy = 〈z, y〉 def=
∑
i∈[k]
zi · yi mod 2.
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µ is the quintessential pairwise independent distribution, with marginals 1/2. Note that the support
of µ consists of the (0, . . . , 0) vector and n other vectors, each with (n + 1)/2 ones and (n − 1)/2
zeros. Moreover, aside from the (0, . . . , 0) vector, all other vectors are incomparable (under the
natural partial order on {0, 1}n).
µ will be the uniform distribution on vectors that complement those of µ: for every x ∈ supp(µ),
there is an x ∈ supp(µ) such that x = (1, . . . , 1) ⊕ x, where ⊕ is the bit-wise XOR. Formally, µ is
the uniform distribution over n+ 1 strings
xz
def
= (1, . . . , 1) ⊕ xz,
where z = (z1, . . . , zk) ∈ {0, 1}k. Note that the support of µ complements that of µ: it consists of
the (1, . . . , 1) vector and n other vectors, each with (n− 1)/2 ones and (n+ 1)/2 zeros. Since µ is
pairwise independent and has marginals 1/2, so does µ.
Set
D =
µ
2
+
µ
2
.
Since µ and µ are pairwise independent and have marginals 1/2, so doesD. Except for the (1, . . . , 1)
and (0, . . . , 0) vectors, none of the vectors in the support of D are comparable (for n ≥ 7). This
means that every function f with f(1, . . . , 1) = 1 and f(0, . . . , 0) = 0 is monotone on the support
of D.
Define the function f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1} as follows. For all x ∈ supp(µ), f(x) = 0. For all
x ∈ supp(µ), f(x) = 1. Note that regardless of how f is defined on other inputs, f is monotone
on the support of D. Furthermore, f is balanced when the inputs are drawn from D. Finally, it is
possible to extend f to all of {0, 1}n in such a way that f will remain monotone and balanced.
It remains to show that all the effects of players in f with respect to D are 0. Since f is constant
on the support of µ, the effects of all players in f with respect to µ are 0. The same is true for µ.
Using Lemma 4.1 below, we conclude that the effects of all players in D are 0.
Note that for functions that are constant on some distribution, all effects are trivially 0 with
respect to that distribution. Such functions, however, are not balanced. The reason f is interesting
is that, with respect to D, the effects are 0 despite f being balanced.
Lemma 4.1 Let η1 and η2 be two distributions on (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ {0, 1}n with marginals 0 < p < 1,
and let η = qη1 + (1− q)η2, where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Then for any g : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1},
E
η
[g|Xi = 1]− E
η
[g|Xi = 0]
= q
(
E
η1
[g|Xi = 1]− E
η1
[g|Xi = 0]
)
+ (1− q)
(
E
η2
[g|Xi = 1]− E
η2
[g|Xi = 0]
)
.
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Proof:
E
η
[g|Xi = 1]− E
η
[g|Xi = 0]
=
1
p
∑
x:xi=1
η(x)g(x) − 1
1− p
∑
x:xi=0
η(x)g(x)
=
1
p
∑
x:xi=1
(
qη1(x) + (1− q)η2(x)
)
g(x) − 1
1− p
∑
x:xi=0
(
qη1(x) + (1− q)η2(x)
)
g(x)
=
1
p
∑
x:xi=1
qη1(x)g(x) − 1
1− p
∑
x:xi=0
qη1(x)g(x)
+
1
p
∑
x:xi=1
(1− q)η2(x)g(x) − 1
1− p
∑
x:xi=0
(1− q)η2(x)g(x)
= q
(
E
η1
[g|Xi = 1]− E
η1
[g|Xi = 0]
)
+ (1− q)
(
E
η2
[g|Xi = 1]− E
η2
[g|Xi = 0]
)
,
where x ∈ {0, 1}n for all sums above.
4.2 Pairwise Independence – Negative Result for Influence
The previous section deals with KKL-type theorems for effect. In this section we ask whether a
KKL-type theorem holds for influence when the distribution is not fully independent. We show
that such a theorem does not hold; but first, we recall the definition of influence. provide a precise
definition of influence.
Definition 4.2 (Definition 2.5 restated) Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function, and let µ be a
distribution on {0, 1}n. The influence of the i’th player is
Ii(f, µ) = Pr
x∼µ
[f(x) 6= f(x⊕ ei)] ,
where ei is the vector with 1 at the i’th index and 0 elsewhere, and ⊕ is bitwise XOR.
Note that the vector x ⊕ ei may not even be in the support of µ. Thus, this may not be
the “correct” measure of influence for non-independent distributions (which is one of the reasons
for considering effect). The original KKL theorem was proved in the case where µ is a fully-
independent distribution (see [9]). Understanding the most general scenario in which KKL holds
is an interesting open question. Our example from the previous section shows that a KKL-type
theorem for effect does not hold under the assumption that µ is pairwise independent. We now show
that a KKL-type theorem does not hold for influence either, assuming only pairwise independence
(and monotonicity).
Consider the pairwise independent distribution D from the previous section. On the support
of D, let f be defined as in the previous section. Note that if n is large enough, for any x, y ∈
supp(D)\{(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)} and any i, j ∈ [n], we have that x⊕ei is not comparable to either y
or y⊕ej. Thus, f can be extended to a monotone function on all of {0, 1}n, such that if x ∈ supp(D),
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then for any i ∈ [n], f(x⊕ ei) = f(x). This implies that f is a balanced monotone function and D
is a pairwise independent distribution such that
Ii(f,D) = 0
for all i ∈ [n].
4.3 Pairwise Independence – Positive Result
In this section we prove our one positive result on KKL-type theorems for effect – Theorem 2.8.
We first restate the theorem.
Theorem 4.3 (Theorem 2.8 restated) Let n+1 = 2k. Let µ be a pairwise independent distribu-
tion on (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, with marginals 1/2 and |supp(µ)| = n+1. Let f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}.
Then ∑
i∈[n]
(Ei(f))2 = Var[f ]
4
.
Proof: Since µ is pairwise independent and has support of size n+1, µ is uniform on its support
(see [4]). Thus, for every x ∈ supp(µ), we have µ(x) = 2−k.
We identify the set {0, . . . , n} with {0, 1}k (by the binary representation). There is a bijection
between {0, 1}k and the support of µ: for every z ∈ {0, 1}k fix a corresponding xz ∈ supp(µ).
Let y be a nonzero element of {0, 1}k, or, equivalently, an element of {1, . . . , n}. Denote by χy
the map from {0, 1}k to {1,−1} defined as
∀ z ∈ {0, 1}k , χy(z) = (−1)xz [y],
where xz[y] is the y’th index of xz. Also denote χ(0,...,0) the map defined as
∀ z ∈ {0, 1}k , χ(0,...,0)(z) = 1.
We will consider the vector space of maps from {0, 1}k to R. We will now show that the set of
maps {χy}y∈{0,1}k form an orthonormal basis for this vector space with respect to the inner product〈
g, g′
〉
=
∑
z∈{0,1}k
2−kg(z)g′(z).
For all y 6= y′ nonzero elements in {0, 1}k, we have〈
χy, χy′
〉
=
∑
z∈{0,1}k
2−kχy(z)χy′(z)
=
∑
z∈{0,1}k
2−k(−1)xz [y](−1)xz [y′]
= Pr[Xy = Xy′ ]− Pr[Xy 6= Xy′ ]
= 0,
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where the last equality follows since µ is pairwise independent with marginals 1/2 (and we think
of y and y′ as elements of [n]). Furthermore,〈
χy, χ(0,...,0)
〉
=
∑
z∈{0,1}k
2−kχy(z) = Pr[Xy = 0]− Pr[Xy = 1] = 0,
where the last equality follows since the marginals are 1/2. Finally, for every y ∈ {0, 1}k, we have
〈χy, χy〉 =
∑
z∈{0,1}k
2−k = 1.
Thus, the set of maps {χy}y∈{0,1}k form an orthonormal basis.
We can also think of f as a map from {0, 1}k to R as follows:
∀ z ∈ {0, 1}k , f(z) = f(xz).
Thus, we can write
f =
∑
y∈{0,1}k
f̂(y)χy,
where
f̂(y) = 〈f, χy〉
(f̂(·) is called the Fourier transform of f). By Parseval’s equality,∑
z∈{0,1}k
|f(z)|2 = 2k
∑
y∈{0,1}k
|f̂(y)|2.
We will now show that |f̂(y)| is twice the effect of the y’th player. For a nonzero y ∈ {0, 1}k, since
the marginals are 1/2,
f̂(y) =
∑
z∈{0,1}k
2−kf(z)(−1)xz [y]
=
∑
z:xz[y]=0
2−kf(z)−
∑
z:xz[y]=1
2−kf(z)
= 2 (E[f |Xy = 0]− E[f |Xy = 1]) .
In addition,
f̂
(
(0, . . . , 0)
)
=
∑
z∈{0,1}k
2−kf(z) = E[f ].
Thus,
4
∑
i∈[n]
|Ei(f)|2 =
∑
y∈{0,1}k
|f̂(y)|2 − |f̂((0, . . . , 0))|2
= 2−k
∑
z∈{0,1}k
|f(z)|2 − |f̂((0, . . . , 0))|2
= E[f
2]− (E[f ])2
= Var[f ].
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